Jordan Peterson has a YouTube video of an interview where he is asked whether a trans woman (male to female) was a real woman. He baited the interviewer (as he likes to do) by “not understanding” the question as he proclaimed to not understand what the interviewer meant by “woman”. All polemic aside, the question is actually quite important and deeper than one would think at first blush. I think there are significant definitional issues at play on at least three points:
1) What “Is” is?
2) What is “real” and is this different from being, what “Is”?
3) What is “woman”?
To address each point in turn (though the overlaps can give you a headache):
1) To the issue of what “Is” is (even US Presidents have a problem with this one): This is a perennial philosophical issue and would take several books to treat properly. “Is” has broad semantic and functional scopes. To keep things simple, I’d separate out four of them: A) “Is” as connoting being, existence, being in the world as a (necessary) property of a thing, B) “Is” as indicating a relationship, or membership if you will. The simplest relationship is a = a. Somewhat more complex would be: “John is a woman”, J “a member” of W, J belongs in the group W, J shares attributes with the group W. These two scopes imply/require a third: C) The “thing” that “is”/exists and stands in relationship to other “things”, and a fourth: D) The world in which these things exist and stand in relationship with one another. I would say that “Is” is more than a relational concept, though entails relationship. These scopes overlap and you can’t separate them. One implies/entails/requires the others.
Did Hamlet of Shakespeare’s play have existence in the world? Well, there was never a prince of Denmark named Hamlet in the history of the country of Denmark, though Hamlet clearly existed in Shakespeare’s story-world of the play Hamlet which, in turn, exists in the “real” world. Now, is existence/being in a story-world the same as having existence/being in the “real” world? (More on “real” below.) Postmodernism would have it that all worlds are story-worlds, so it makes no difference, it makes no sense to distinguish them. Ie: If a tree falls in the woods and there is no one there to hear it, it does not make a sound, because there is no tree. Or, there is no story-world in which the tree could exist because there is no one there to create the story-world. But, in the end, I think we would have to concede that there is a significant difference between the existence of the person Shakespeare and the existence of the “person” Hamlet. Shakespeare exists in a different world than Hamlet does (maybe even a different kind of world), so Shakespeare has a different kind of existence based on the kind of world in which he exists.
We then encounter the problem of how to define these different worlds, as they seem to be demonstrably different. One way would be to posit that “concreteness”/”actuality” is the essential feature of the world Shakespeare inhabits compared to the world of Hamlet which is fictitious. One would have to use “concreteness” very broadly, to include e.g. sound waves, so maybe the distinguishing feature is to have a physical measurability of some kind. To have being then, is to have identifiable/demonstrable physical characteristics.
2) To the issue of what “real” is: I think this one is a bit easier. Let us say that I spent some serious coin on a Rolex watch. Then after many years of faithful timekeeping I have it cleaned only to find out that the thing was made in China. I am royally miffed. But why? It looks like a Rolex, is heavy like a Rolex, ticks like a Rolex and keeps time like a Rolex. I even went scuba diving with it to whatever feet and no problems. So why am I upset? Well, of course because it is not a “real” Rolex. It wasn’t made in Switzerland by Rolex but does have all the other attributes/characteristics of a “real” Rolex watch (the materials and construction are identical). So, is it a “real” Rolex?
The classic example is the “Ship of Theseus”. Theseus, king of Athens sets out on a ship for Athens after slaying the Minotaur, thus rescuing his people. During the voyage, the ship breaks to the point where every last part of the ship has been replaced by a new one. So, is the ship that Theseus docks back in port the same ship? Is it “the ship of Theseus” or some other ship? Now suppose the discarded parts are all fixed and reassembled into a second ship. Which is the “real” “ship of Thesus”? Although more a paradox about identity with change over time, the Theseus paradox also touches on the concept of “reality” or “authenticity”.
So, again, we need defining characteristics, including origins I suspect, to determine what is “real”. I just bought a camera lens. It was a Zeiss lens but made in Japan by Zeiss and not in the original Zeiss factory in Germany. Does it matter if it was made in Japan and not in Germany? I guess the difference between the counterfeit Chinese Rolex and the genuine Japanese Zeiss is one of authenticity: The Rolex was a lie, the Zeiss was not. The Chinese Rolex purported to be from Switzerland and was not. The Zeiss was purported to be from Japan and was. So “authenticity” or “genuineness” seem to factor in.
3) To the issue of what is “woman”: Here we really get into the weeds. Postmodern thinking seems to be that “woman” (“gender”) is really an abstract construct, historically associated with certain physical characteristics (phenotype) and behavioral/performative habits (Butler 2006) and is simply an expression of something else and not a thing in itself. (One can wonder what all the Brouhaha is all about then, but I’ll off on that for now.) I suppose the “evidence” for this is the (obvious) fact that some “biological males” really believe themselves to be “women”, and that there are cultures where such expression is (supposedly) unproblematically fluid. But then, we can take drugs that make us firmly believe we are slime-molds. Would this really make us so? To argue that that is clearly impossible would be to argue from physical characteristics, which cannot be allowed if transgenderism is to be maintained. Take a phasmid, an insect that can make itself look like the twig it is sitting on to avoid predators (see “Master and Commander”). Does the phasmid become a twig just because it looks and behaves like a twig? It seems to me that it remains a phasmid. Add to this the clear sociopolitical tone of this issue: I as a white male would be celebrated for “coming out” as a “woman”. See what happens if I try to “come out” as African American. The response would be quite different though the underlying “identification” issue is identical.
The thing seems to boil down to this: Whatever the individual self constructs itself to be is what it is. But what is this “self” then? Are we to resurrect some form of disembodied spirit? I was under the impression that Nietzsche and the later logical positivists dealt with this a long time ago. We cannot allow a link between “self” and body, as that would take us back to an argument from biology, which clearly leads in the wrong direction for transgenderism. Add to this the proliferation of genders/identities, often with quite blurry lines of demarcation, and deliberately so. I think the staunch advocate of transgenderism will quickly fall down a solipsistic rabbit hole from which there is no escape: The self is the self and can be/do what it wants. But this empties a concepts “self”, “woman”, “man”, “trans”, “queer” and so on, of any content and literally becomes meaningless. a = a is obviously true but tells us nothing, and we have no criteria by which we can say that a is “a member of” any group but itself so a as “a member” of some group is basically the same as saying that a = a.
So, is a “trans woman” a “real” woman? From the above we would have to say “no”, because the concept of “woman” in a transgender world is void of meaning/content whereas “woman” in a cis-gender world has clear definition. All we could really say is that a trans woman is whatever it is and leave it at that. It is curious that “gender” is really a grammatical concept hijacked into a sexualized context (probably by John Money in 1955). Universal grammars allow for 3 genders: Male, female and neuter.
Wonder why that is?